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I. INTRODUCTION'
Imagine you are standing in Times Square with a digital camera. Creative
works surround you: advertisements, buildings, and public art are visible on all
sides. You plan to snap a few photos, but are not sure how you might use them.
Perhaps you will delete them immediately. If you like them, you might post them
to your website. If they are really great, maybe you will sell some prints, enter a
photo contest, or even sell photos to an advertiser, stock photo agency, or
magazine. With digital technologies, the possibilities are endless.
Copyright law, however, may not allow you to take advantage of all of these
possibilities. The creative works that surround you are almost certainly protected
by copyright, and using photographs that incorporate those works may be a prima
facie copyright violation.2 Although the legal defenses of de minimis and fair use
probably protect some uses of these photographs-including, for example, the
capture of the image or showing a print to a few friends-they do not apply to
others. Most notably, they may not apply to many of the uses brought within the
reach of consumers by new technologies, such as posting photographs to a
website or selling high-quality prints. Even in cases where de minimis or fair use
might apply, the ad hoc nature of these tests makes it difficult to rely on them.
There is, however, an exception to this copyright conundrum. Pursuant to 17
U.S.C. 5 120(a), all uses are privileged if the only copyrighted items the relevant
image includes are architectural works. This Article argues that this rule-the
absolute privilege to capture and use images of architectural works visible from
public places-should be extended, in modified form, to all copyrightable works.
Such an extension would permit consumers to take full advantage of the
photographic opportunities made possible by new technologies, and, in so doing,
has the potential to create great social value at little cost.
This Article has four Parts. Part I is this introduction. Part II describes the
problem, showing how technology is empowering amateurs to make new uses of
images containing copyrighted materials, and how copyright law is ill-equipped to
handle this change. Part III proposes a solution to this problem-an extension
of 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) to cover photographic representations of all copyrighted
works-and explains why this solution makes sense. Part IV is a brief conclusion.

1 The author would like to thank Professor Peter Menell, Professor Robert Merges, and
especially Professor Pamela Samuelson for comments on earlier drafts.
2 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra notes 14-19 and
accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol13/iss1/2

2

Inesi: Images of Public Places: Extending the Copyright Exemption for Pi

20051
II.

IMAGES OF PUBLIC PLACES

THE PROBLEM: COPYRIGHT CONSTRAINTS ON PUBLIC PHOTOGRAPHY

New technologies are having a revolutionary impact on imaging. In just a few
years, technological advances including digital imaging, gallery-quality home
printing, Internet publishing, and desktop editing software have radically reduced
costs and expanded possibilities for photographers and filmmakers (a group
collectively referred to herein as "photographers").' These changes are having
two important effects on the imaging market. First, the line between amateur and
professional photography is blurring. Second, many more people are taking and
using many more images, thereby increasing the importance of imaging as a
communications tool.
Copyright must be updated to account for these changes. Rules that may have
made sense when image uses were highly stratified do not adequately address new
imaging possibilities. This is particularly true for a class of images referred to
herein as "public photographs": images that (i) incorporate only items visible
from pubic places,4 and (ii) incorporate the copyrighted work(s) of third parties.
Images captured in Times Square are paradigmatic examples of public
photographs.
Public photographs have a copyright problem because they are both
unavoidable for photographers depicting public places and facial violations of
copyright. Further, the two principal defenses that photographers might rely
upon to avoid liability for their uses of public photography-de minimis and fair
use-are of limited applicability.' De minimis clearly applies only in cases where
the copyrightable work is either shown only in part or cannot be seen clearly. Fair
use clearly applies only to uses of public photography that were commonplace
before technology increased the photographic possibilities of amateur
photographers (a group collectively referred to herein as "consumers").
This Part describes these issues in detail. Section A describes the potential for
copyright infringement, beginning with an explanation of the practical
considerations that have immunized consumers from copyright liability for their
public photography, and then showing how technology changes this calculus.
Section B explores several copyright defenses--de minimis, fair use, and a special
exception for images of architectural works-and concludes that none of them

3 Similarly, the terms "photography" and "imaging" as used herein are intended to include
filmmaking as well as still photography. Although there are some important differences between the
two activities---differences that are pointed out when applicable-the problem described in this
Article, and the suggested solution to that problem, apply to both.
' "Public places" are places that: (i) are owned by the state, and (ii) are open to the general
public. For a full discussion of this definition, see infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
For a detailed discussion of the de minimis and fair use defenses in the public photography
context, see infra Parts II.B. 1 and II.B.2.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2005

3

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2

J. INTELL PROP.L[l

[Vol. 13:61

adequately shields consumers from liability for public photography uses made
possible by new technologies. Finally, Section C shows why the market does not
provide a solution to this problem, thereby demonstrating the need for a new
legal defense.
To help frame and clarify the discussion, listed below are five factual examples
that are referred to periodically throughout this Article:
Example 1: A photographer shoots a photograph in Times Square
that includes a copyrighted sculpture in one corner. The
photograph is subsequently sold as a print.
Example 2: Same facts as example 1, but the sculpture is
prominently displayed in the photograph, and the photograph is not
sold, but only shown to family and friends.
Example 3: Same facts as example 2, but the photograph is also
posted to a website.
Example 4: Same facts as example 2, but the photograph is also
printed on a political poster that is distributed throughout the city.
Example 5: Same facts as example 2, but the photograph is also
entered in a photo contest.
A. THE POTENTIAL FOR INFRINGEMENT

1. Copyright Ubiquiov and Prima Fade Infringement. Copyrightable works are
unavoidable in many of our public places, especially in urban areas.
Advertisements are placed on every conceivable surface, from bus benches to
shop windows to billboards. Newspapers, magazines, and posters are displayed
prominently at newsstands on every street comer. Murals, sculptures, and other
pieces of public art are widespread. Even buildings,6 clothing fabric designs,7 and
jewelry8 are copyrightable, at least in part. This list is not exhaustive;9 almost any
work exhibiting even a modicum of original creativity is copyrightable.'0 Each

6

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2000).

7 1 MELviLLE B. NIMNER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[fH][2] (2000).

Seegeneraly Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1486 (2d

Cit. 2001).
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (noting that works of authorship "include" the listed works); id § 101
(noting that the word "including" as used in Title 17 is "illustrative but not limitative").
10 Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,345, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275, 1278
(1991) (noting that the amount of original creativity necessary for copyright "is extremely low; even
a slight amount will suffice"); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 136 (2004) (noting that copyright
covers "practically any creative work that is reduced to tangible form").
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such work is automatically protected from the moment of its first fixation in a
tangible form"-no registration or other formalities are required. 2
Given this ubiquity of creative works, photographs of public places often
necessarily incorporate copyrighted items. As the author of a legal guide for
photographers puts it: "Mt is impossible to avoid including copyrighted elements
in many photographs."' 3 Indeed, copyrighted works are so inextricably linked in
the public's view, both literal and figurative, of many public places, that a
photograph that fails to incorporate any of these works may not effectively
represent the place depicted. For example, try to imagine a photograph of Times
Square without any copyrightable items-no advertisements, buildings, public art,
jewelry, or newspapers. Would such a photograph even be recognizable as Times
Square?
Despite their inevitability, all public photographs are potential copyright
violations. Copyright law grants a number of exclusive rights to copyright
holders, including the rights to reproduce, 4 display, 5 distribute, 6 and prepare
derivative works 7 of their copyrighted works. 8 Although some debate exists
about whether a photograph depicting a copyrighted item is a derivative work or
a copy,' 9 the result for the photographer without a license is the same: merely
pressing the shutter on his camera is a facial violation of the copyright holder's
exclusive rights. Further, even if the photographer avoids liability for capture of
a public photograph, most uses he might make of that photograph are prima facie
copyright violations: making and selling prints violates the duplication right and

1117

U.S.C. § 102(a).

12 Of course, not all copyrightable works are in fact protected by copyright-there are limits to

copyright's protections, most notably the limited term of copyright. However, it is unlikely that
many of the copyrightable items encountered in public places (other than perhaps architectural
works) would have exceeded that term, which is at least seventy years for a work created after 1977.
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
13 BERT P. KRAGES, LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR PHOTOGRAPHERS: THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES

OF MAKING IMAGES 64 (Michelle Perkins ed., Amherst Media, Inc. 2002).
14

17 U.S.C. §106(1) (2000).
§106(5).

15Id

"' Id. §106(3).
17

Id. 106(2).

I" Any third party contravention of these rights, regardless of size or importance, is punishable

by damages (actual or statutory, including up to $150,000 per infraction for willful infringement), an
injunction, and seizure of the offending items. Id. §§ 502-505.
19For example, the 9th Circuit in Ets-Hokin v. Sk~y Spit, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077-78, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1775 (9th Cir. 2000), suggested (but did not hold) that a photograph of a
vodka bottle would have been a derivative work had the bottle itself been copyrightable. This
analysis was criticized in SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305-06, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, 1816 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), which held photographs of copyrighted frames to
be copies, not derivative works.
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the distribution right; publishing the photograph on a website violates the display
right and the duplication right; selling the photograph for use in a magazine
violates the duplication and distribution rights.
Fortunately, the reality of public photography has not been as grim as the
previous paragraph suggests. Photographers routinely capture and use images of
public places without adverse copyright consequences. How is this possible? The
reasons differ for professionals and consumers. Professionals often license image
uses that would otherwise violate third-party copyrights. Thus, for example, a car
manufacturer that features Times Square in its advertisement might license the use
of any copyrighted works that appear in the ad. Alternatively, professionals can
sometimes rely upon the fair use or de minimis doctrines, each of which privileges
certain uses of third-party copyrighted works.2" The main drawback of these
doctrines-their inherent uncertainty-is not generally an insurmountable
problem for professionals, many of
whom have both the sophistication and the
21
resources to litigate any gray areas.
Consumers have been protected from copyright liability by their limitations.
With rare exceptions, resource constraints have limited consumers to capturing
low-quality images and sharing the resulting prints or home movies with family
and friends. As will be described in detail below, 22 these traditional activities may
be protected by the fair use and/or de minimis doctrines. Regardless, however,
of the applicability of fair use and de minimis, consumers' limitations have
protected them in a more fundamental way: consumers were unable to use their
public photographs in ways that threatened copyright owners. 3 Even if sharing
a photograph of Times Square with a few friends is a technical violation of
copyright, it almost certainly has no significant effect on the copyright owner.
Thus, it makes little sense to take legal action: the chances of winning are not
great, and even if the copyright holder wins, the costs associated with legal action
(both in terms of actual money spent and the potential for bad publicity) almost
always outweigh the benefits.

20 For a detailed discussion of each of these doctrines, see infra Parts II.B. 1 and II.B.2.
21 For an example of professional willingness to litigate fair use, see Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v.

CNN,Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7128, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15937, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (numerous media companies preferred litigating fair use to paying $5,000-$10,000 licensing

fees for use of certain film clips).
22 See

infra Parts II.B. 1 and II.B.2.
See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, DistributiveValues in Copyrigbt,83 TEx. L. REv. 1535, 1538

(2005) (noting that "people without independent wealth or financial backing traditionally have had

little capacity to implicate the Copyright Act inways that would justify enforcement actions against
them");Joseph P. Lu, Copynigbt Laws' Tbeoy of the Consumer,44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 417 (2003) (noting

that "because the costs of enforcement likely outweigh any economic harm, such cases will rarely
if ever be prosecuted or even the subject of a cease-and-desist letter").
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2. Technology Makes Legal Acion Against Consumers More Likey.

New

technologies change the balance described above. By reducing costs and
expanding photographic possibilities for consumers, new technologies permit
consumers to use public photographs in ways that affect copyright holders,
thereby increasing the risk of copyright conflict between the two groups. This
subsection describes these new technologies, and their effects, in detail.
At the forefront of recent changes to imaging technologies is a shift from film
to digital. 4 Digital technology holds a number of advantages for consumers.
First, digital cameras are both easier and less expensive to use: consumers do not
have to purchase film or pay for development, and can see their photographs
immediately after shooting them. Second, the switch to digital technology allows
consumers to take advantage of a number of other powerful tools, including highquality photo printers2 5 and editing software such as Adobe Photoshop and
Apple's iFilm.26 Finally, amateur image-makers with digital images can use the
Internet to publish 27 and distribute the photographs to a much broader audience
than was previously possible.28
New technologies are also leading to an increase in the quality of the
photographs produced by consumers. In the past, high-quality images often
required professional equipment and expertise, but new technologies eliminate
some of this need. Film and development lab quality are irrelevant to digital
photography, automated cameras and camcorders are getting smarter regarding

24 As one mark of this change, between 1996 and 2003 consumer sales of digital cameras in the
United States increased from less than one million units to 12.5 million units, and have now
surpassed yearly sales of film cameras. This trend is expected to continue. PHOTO MKTG. ASS'N
INT'L, PMA MKTG. RESEARCH, PHOTO INDUS. 2004: REVIEW AND FORECAST 4 (2004). Further,

half of all photographs now taken are digital photographs. Katie Hafner, DigitalMemories,PiingUp,
May ProveFketin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at Al.
" It is now possible to buy an inkjet printer for less than $1000 that is capable of producing
gallery-quality, archival prints. The Epson 2200, which generally sells for about $700, is one such
model.
26 The power of this software is remarkable: it gives users more control over their images than
even the most advanced labs using traditional techniques.
27 A photographer needs only the most rudimentary technological skills to publish on the
Internet: a number of services have arisen that permit dragging and dropping photos from your
computer's hard drive directly to a personal webpage created for you. Examples include Ofoto
(www.ofoto.com), Snapfish (www.snapfish.com), and Shutterfly (www.shutterfly.com). More
professional uses, such as creation of a customized personal website or distribution of video over
the Internet, require a bit more skill but are within the reach of most consumers.
s The importance and implications of the Internet as an inexpensive content distribution tool
have been noted byanumber of scholars. See, e.g.,LAWRENCELESSIG,THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 120-41 (Random House, Inc. 2001); Dan

Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004).
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scene exposure,29 and the cost of high-quality equipment has dropped
precipitously.30 Indeed, consumer equipment is already so good that some
digicams are suitable for professional work, 31 award-winning films have been
made with consumer equipment, 2 and some high-end prosumer digital cameras
rival the quality of medium-format film cameras.33 Moreover, the Internet makes
it easy for consumers to learn the tricks of the trade: they can now choose from
a number of high-quality websites 4 for information on shooting techniques, color
management, aesthetic considerations, and any other topic relevant to imaging.35
These technological changes are having several important effects on the
production of photography. First, new technologies enable consumers to capture
and use images in ways once reserved to professionals.36 Amateur photographers
that a few years ago were able to do little more than share their photographs with

2 Cameras are also becoming smaller: new technologies such as the camera phone, shirt-pocket
digicams, and disposable cameras allow consumers to bring cameras with them everywhere.
0 This is especially true of video. See LESSIG, smpra note 28, at 124 ("We are soon to enter a time
when filmmakers will be able to produce high-quality film for digital devices at 1 percent of the cost
of the same production with traditional tools.").
3' Alex Majoli, a photojournalist with the prestigious Magnum agency, and winner of numerous
awards, including Magazine Photographer of the Year at the Best of Photojournalism 2004 awards,
uses an Olympus digicam for much of his professional work. See also Michael Reichmann, Digicams
v. DSLRs.: The New Battle Rayak, The Luminous Landscape, at http://www.luminous-landscape.
com/essays/ligicams-vs-dslrs.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) ("I believe that even serious fine-art
photographers and working pros will now find several digicams worth considering-something that
I might not have said 12-18 months ago.').
32 See Van Houweling, supranote 23, at 1535 (noting that Tamation, a film made for $218, was
"the surprise hit of the Cannes and Sundance film festivals").
" See Michael Reichmann, The Ultimate Shoot-Out: State-of-the-Art35mm DigitalVs. Medium Format
Film,The Luminous Landscape, at http://www.luniinous-landscape.com/reviews/shootout.shtml
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
3 Examples include www.photo.net, www.luminouslandscape.com, www.steves-digicams.com,
www.robgalbraith.com, and www.filmmaker.com. Most of these websites do not represent one
particular manufacturer or store, and thus may be more reliable than websites with a more overt
commercial agenda. Indeed, some photographic writers on the Internet are quite vocal about their
independence. See, e.g., Michael Reichmann, Wly Don't They Get It?: A Critiqueof the CurentState of
the Photographiclndustry,The Luminous Landscape, athttp://www.lurninous-landscape.com/essays/
get-it.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) ('When was the last time you saw a photography magazine
seriously criticize a product? Not often. Unfortunately web sites that accept advertising suffer from
the same dilemma. It's really only non-commercial sites like this one that are unafraid to tell the

truth.').

3s To a certain extent this information was available through books and periodicals before the
Internet. However, the Internet is a more powerful informational tool for several reasons: it
contains more information than any single book or periodical, it is searchable, it is interactive, and,
more often than not, it is free.
' For general information on how new technologies are enabling amateur creativity, see Hunter
& Lastowka, spra note 28, at 24-58.
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a few friends can now, at low cost, publish those images online to a potential
worldwide audience, create high-quality prints for sale
or exhibition, and test the
37
market for sales to magazines or film distributors.
The blurring of the line between consumer and professional photography has
profound legal implications. As described in the last section, the major reason
that third-party copyright owners have not taken action against consumer users
of public photography is that such uses had no significant effect on them. 38 Now,
with new technologies, consumers can use public photographs in ways that affect
underlying copyright holders. For example, consumers can now put photographs
on the Internet that portray the copyrighted work in a negative light; make,
market and sell multiple prints of photographs incorporating a copyrighted work
in a way that plays on the value of the copyrighted work; and distribute highquality films incorporating the copyrighted work. Thus regardless of
motive-money, a moral rights conception of creativity, or control of a carefullycrafted public image-copyright holders have greater incentives to stop consumer
use of public photographs incorporating their works.
A second effect of new technologies, more people taking more photographs,
further increases the likelihood of copyright conflict. New consumer camera
equipment, including camera-phones, disposable cameras, and ever-smaller
digicams and camcorders make it easy to always have a camera at the ready. This
both attracts new photographers-those who would not carry a camera with them
but will carry a cameraphone-and makes it likely that current photographers will
shoot more images. Further, the ease of digital photography is attracting new
photographers, while the low marginal cost of taking additional digital photos
compared to film photos will lead to more images taken. Finally, the new
photographic possibilities presented by technology, from making professional
quality prints to posting on the Internet, can be expected to increase interest in
photography.39 This increase in the general popularity of photography increases

" Id. at 36. New technologies "are increasingly allowing individual, poorly capitalized players
to produce works that are competing for attention with the works created by corporate and highly
capitalized players."
s See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
3 There is some evidence that this shift is already occurring. One data point demonstrating the
increase in the photography market is total camera sales. After holding steady for over ten years,
camera sales have increased from approximately sixteen million in 1996 to almost twenty-five million
in 2003. PHOTO MARKETING ASW'N INT'L, supra note 24, at 4-5. The rise of digital photography
explains some of this increase-to some extent consumers may simply be replacing their old
equipment. During this same period, however, sales of one-time cameras, which are counted
separately, increased from 72 million to 211 million. Id.
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the likelihood of conflict between consumers and copyright holders for the simple
reason that more photographs means more copyright violations.'
Finally, the likelihood of copyright enforcement against consumers is
increasing because copyright owners are more likely to find out about infringing
uses of their works. This too is tied to new technologies. Many of the public
photography uses brought within the reach of consumers by new
technologies-such as publishing of images on the Internet and submission of
high-quality films to film festivals-are more public than were traditional
consumer public photograph uses. Moreover, new search technologies make it
easier for copyright holders to locate and investigate possible infringements.41 All
else equal, it is clear that copyright owners who know about infringements are
more likely to take action than those who do not.
Of course, the fact that copyright owners will, in many cases, have a greater
incentive to take legal action does not mean that they will file lawsuits against
every use of a public photograph. Traditional consumer uses of public
photographs-such as showing a photo album or a home movie to a few
friends-are likely to continue to fly below the enforcement radar. Even some
new uses, like posting to an uncommonly visited family photo website, may not
garner much legal attention. After all, copyright owners only have so much time,
money, and goodwill to expend and will likely concentrate on the public
photograph uses most damaging to them.
However, the problem should not be understated. Many of the consumer
public photograph uses most likely to garner legal attention are exactly those that
are most likely to be beneficial to society: new voices trying to communicate with
broad audiences using photography.42 Further, the danger of enforcement may
be increasing for reasons other than technological change, as copyright owners
try to extract more value from their works43 and become more aggressive about
punishing perceived infringers.' Finally, formal legal action may not be necessary

40 See Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 28, at 964 ("[The increasingly widespread use of more
powerful digital cameras, scanners and camera phones will increase unauthorized copyright
aftermarkets for images.").
41 It is now possible to limit Internet search results to images. See, e.g., Google Image Search,
http://images.google.com.
42 For further discussion of the importance of imaging as a communications tool, see infra notes
144-47 and accompanying text.
41 Jessica Litman has argued that a fundamentally new conception of copyright is arising, one
that permits copyright owners to "extract all the potential commercial value from works of
authorship, even if that means that uses that have long been deemed legal are now brought within
the copyright owner's control." Jessica Litman, WarStones, 20 CARDoZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 345
(2002). See also JESsIcA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, 79-81 (2000) (describing changing
conceptions of copyright).
' Evidence of this newfound aggressiveness can be found in the lawsuits filed by the Recording
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to chill consumer public photography. Cease-and-desist letters cost little to send,
pose almost no risk for the copyright owner, and stand a good chance of
convincing consumers, most of whom are likely to be risk averse, to change
course.
B. THE INADEQUACY OF COPYRIGHT DEFENSES

The last section showed that technology makes conflict between consumer
users of public images and copyright holders more likely. This conflict, however,
will not necessarily lead to litigation. There are several legal defenses that may
serve as a bulwark against unreasonable enforcement of copyright against
consumers. Three of these defenses are considered below. The conclusion:
many of the traditional consumer uses of public photography-such as capture
alone, or showing prints to a few friends-are probably already privileged, but the
same cannot be said for public photography uses brought within the reach of
consumers by new technologies.
1. DeMinimisis NotApplicable in Most Cases. The legal maxim of de minimis non
curatlex is often translated as "the law does not concern itself with trifles."4 5 As
this definition indicates, the basic idea behind de minimis, when used as a defense
to copyright infringement, is that no liability should attach to infringements of
little consequence. The devil, however, is in the details. There are few published
decisions analyzing de minimis in the copyright context,46 and those courts that
have invoked de minimis have done so in at least three different ways: (i) as an
element of substantial similarity; (ii) as a separate affirmative defense; and (iii) as
an element of fair use. Each of these possibilities is briefly explored below.
Substantial similarity is one of the fundamental elements of copyright
infringement-an infringing work must be substantially similar to the original

Industry Association of America (RIAA) against individual music file-sharers. Over 6000 of these
lawsuits have been filed to date, and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) recently
announced that it would adopt the same strategy. Frank Ahrens, MPAA to Sue Over Movie File
Shainn" Industrj Following Lead Of Music Companies, WAsH. POST, Nov. 5, 2004, at E01.
"5Sacklunch.net, Latin and Greek Phrases, http://www.sacklunch.net/Latin/D/deminimisno
ncuratlex.html (Nov. 7, 2005). See also Ringgold v. Black Entrn't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74,
44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (2d Cit. 1997); Pierre N. Leval, NimmerLecture: FairUse Rescued,
44 UCLA L. REV.1449,1457 (1997).
46 This is probably due to the fact that de minimis has historically protected uses that are unlikely
to rise to the level of litigation. See, e.g., Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1495 (2d Cit. 2001) ("The de minimis doctrine is rarely discussed in copyright opinions
because suits are rarely brought over trivial instances of copying."); Leval, supra note 45, at 1457-58
(noting that certain questions fall in the category of "[q]uestions that never need to be answered.
If [they] did need to be answered, I believe the answer would be provided by the doctrine of de
minimis non curat lex ... .
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work for an infringement to be actionable.47 In the case of literal copying, which
is the portion of substantial similarity doctrine that would apply to public
photographs, a new work is substantially similar to an original only if more than
a de minimis amount of the original is copied. 48 Using this theory, several courts
have held that photographs that contain only a small portion of a copyrightable
work, or that contain copyrightable elements that are not entirely recognizable, are
not copyright violations. Thus, for example, where several artworks visible in a
film, "never appear in focus, and except for two of the shots, are seen in the
distant background, often obstructed from view by one of the actors," the Second
49
Circuit ruled the use de minimis for purposes of substantial similarity analysis.
However, the substantial similarity branch of de minimis applies only in
limited factual circumstances. The Second Circuit showed just how limited in
Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, a case in which a copyrighted poster
appeared in the background of a television show for 26.75 seconds, and, though
clearly visible, was slightly out of focus. 50 The court held that "the de minimis
threshold for actionable copying of protected expression has been crossed."'"
More broadly, and despite the Ringgold court's mention of the length of time the
copyrighted works appeared, substantial similarity analysis generally focuses on
the amount of the original copyrighted work that is taken, not the importance of
the use made of that work.52 Accordingly, even if an individual copyrighted item
is a small and unimportant part of the image in question, and even if the image is
used in insignificant ways, the photographer is unlikely to escape liability under
this version of de minimis if the copyrighted item is both shown in its entirety and
clearly visible.
A second approach views de minimis as a separate affirmative defense in cases
in which, although all elements of infringement are present, the infringing use is

41 1 NIMMER & NIMMER,

supra note 7, at 13.03[A].
s Id at 13.03[A] [2].
9 Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215,216-18,47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215,121617 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns, 345 F.3d 922, 925, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1369, 1371 (6th Cir. 2003) (no substantial similarity when two copyrighted dental posters appeared
"fleetingly," and "primarily out of focus" in the background of the defendant's text messaging
commercial); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 77 (noting that "[i]n some circumstances, a visual work... might
ultimately be filmed at such a distance and so out of focus that a typical program viewer would not
discern any decorative effect," and thus would qualify for de minimis treatment).
10 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 73.
s"Id at 77.
52 1 NIMMER & NIMMEit, supra note 7, at 13.03[A][2] (noting that substantial similarity is
measured by reference to the plaintiff's work, not by the importance of the plaintiff's work in the
defendant's work).
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insignificant.5 3 The most prominent proponent of this view is Judge Leval of the
Second Circuit, whose views are best summarized in Dais v. The Gap, Inc.:
Parents in Central Park photograph their children perched on Jose
de Creeft's Alice in Wonderland sculpture. We record television
programs aired while we are out, so as to watch them at a more
convenient hour. Waiters at a restaurant sing "Happy Birthday" at
a patron's table. When we do such things, it is not that we are
breaking the law but unlikely to be sued given the high cost of
litigation. Because of the de minimis doctrine, in trivial instances of
54
copying, we are in fact not breaking the law.
Despite this eloquent summary, the court in Davis ruled that use by a clothing
store of copyrighted eyeglasses in an advertisement did not qualify as de
minimis,' 5 resting its decision on the fact that the eyeglasses were "highly
noticeable.""6 However, the same court came to a different conclusion in
7
Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. A~rak-Hamway International."
In that case the defendant
created a brochure prominently featuring the plaintiff's product." The court
ruled the infringement de minimis because the brochure was never used.59
As these cases suggest, the principal focus of this second branch of de minimis
is the importance of the use made of the copyrighted item. This can be viewed
in two ways. First, the Davisruling suggests that if use of the incorporated work
is something less than "highly noticeable" it may be de minimis even if the work
incorporating it is used for commercial purposes. Though it is not clear how
minor the use must be, this view of de minimis could provide some protection for
uses that would not qualify under the substantial similarity branch of de minimis.6
For example, a photograph of Times Square incorporating a number of

s Ringgol, 126 F.3d at 74.
5' Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1495 (2d Cir. 2001).
For another summary ofJudge Leval's view of de minimis, see Leval, supra note 45, at 1457-58.
s5Davis, 246 F.3d at 173.
56

id.

17 Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 668 F.2d 699,702,214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
175, 177 (2d Ci. 1982).
58

Id at 701.

'9Id at 703.
60 It is possible that the difference between substantial similarity de minimis and Davis de
minimis is greater in theory than in practice. Although the courts in Ringgold, Sandoval,and Gordon
did consider the quantity of the copyrighted work taken (when, for example, considering the degree
to which the copyrighted work was in focus or obstructed), they also placed some weight on their
prominence in the new work (when considering, for example, the amount of time the copyrighted
work appeared on screen).
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copyrighted works might not pass muster under the substantial similarity version
of de minimis if the works are in focus and clearly visible, but might qualify under
this version of de minimis if the incorporated works are of little importance to the
photograph.
Second, Knickerbocker suggests that even if the use is highly noticeable, de
minimis may be found when the new work is not used for any significant purpose.
This is the rationale most likely to protect traditional consumer uses of public
photographs, such as mere capture of images or showing home movies to a few
friends, since these uses are unlikely to affect copyright owners in any significant
way. It is less clear whether uses made possible by new technologies-such as
posting images to a website, selling prints, or competing in a film festival-would
qualify.
The main problem with the de minimis as a separate defense rationale is that
most courts do not appear to ascribe to it in the copyright context. As one
commentator notes, "Whe overwhelming thrust of authority upholds liability
even under circumstances in which the use of the copyrighted work is of minimal
consequence."'" For example, the court in Lebbus v. Woods refused to consider the
fact that the copyrighted work in question appeared only briefly in the defendant's
film, noting that "[w]hether an infringement is de minimis is determined by the
amount taken without authorization from the infringed work, and not by the
characteristics of the infringing work."62 Thus, although promising for some
common public photography uses, de minimis may be generally unavailing as a
separate defense to copyright infringement.
Finally, de minimis has been considered as part of fair use analysis. InAmsinck
v. Columbia Pictures, a case in which the plaintiff's artistic mobile was briefly shown
in the defendant's film, the court incorporated de minimis in its discussion of the
fourth fair use factor (the effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted
work).63 The court concluded that "[i]n situations where the copyright owner
suffers no demonstrable harm from the use of the work, fair use overlaps with the
'
legal doctrine of de minimis, requiring a finding of no liability for infringement.
However, it is not clear what the concept of de minimis adds to fair use analysis.

61

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at 8.01 [G].
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62,65,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1790, 1792

62 Woods

(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
63 Amsinckv. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044,1048-49,33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1131,
1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1 Id at 1049.
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Indeed, it may merely confuse matters.65 As one court puts it, de minimis is
"inappropriate ... to be enlisted in fair use analysis."6 6
In sum, the doctrine of de minimis in copyright is a confused one; courts
apply it in different ways to similar factual scenarios. Nevertheless, it is possible
to draw some tentative conclusions. As part of substantial similarity analysis, de
minimis clearly applies to photographs in which the relevant copyrighted items
are obscured or out of focus. Thus, to return to the examples introduced at the
beginning of this Part, the photographer in example #1-in which a sculpture
appears in a corner of a photograph-would qualify if the incorporated sculpture
were not clearly visible. Additionally, some courts apply de minimis as a separate
defense to cases in which either: (i) the copyrighted work is an unimportant part
of the image as a whole, or (ii) the use made of the final image is insignificant.
These courts would probably exempt from liability the photographers in example
#2 (a photograph that prominently features a sculpture is shown to family and
friends) and perhaps example #3 (the same photograph is posted to a website)
and example #5 (the same photograph is entered in a photo contest). However,
most courts do not subscribe to this latter conception of de minimis, and thus it
cannot be relied upon. Even the most liberal conception of de minimis would
not protect the photographer in example #4 (the same photograph is used on a
political poster).
2. FairUse Is Too Uncertain. Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement
that "permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."6
A fair use determination is made by reference to four statutory factors,68 though
courts are permitted to consider any other factor deemed relevant.69 The fair use
test eschews bright-line rules, as the analysis is always fact-intensive.7"

6 See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70,75-76,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001,

1005-06 (2d Cir. 1997).
66Id
67 Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1627 (1990), quoing Iowa
State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (2d Cir.
1980).
68 These factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
69 Id. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560,
225 U.S.P.Q.

(BNA) 1073, 1081 (1985).
70

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1964
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At first blush, fair use seems a promising avenue of defense for consumer use
of public photographs. After all, copyright liability for use of public photographs
would clearly stifle the creativity of photographers."' Yet, as with de minimis, the
devil is in the details. The fact-intensive nature of the fair use analysis, combined
with considerable argument and confusion over how the test should be applied,
makes it difficult to predict the applicability of fair use in all but the most obvious
cases. Nevertheless, an exploration of some of the cases and factors most likely
to be relevant in a public photography fair use determination can provide some
insight.
The most obvious problem with fair use for public photography is factor three
in the statutory test-the "amount and substantiality of the portion [of the
copyrighted work] used."72 On its face, this factor appears to militate against a
finding of fair use, as photographic images generally copy the entire copyrightable
work(s) in question.7 3 Indeed, as with de minimis, the traditional rule holds that
74
"fair use is typically unavailing when an entire work has been copied." Several
courts applied this rule in the context of visual arts. For example, the 9th Circuit
in Walt Disney Productionsv. Air Piratesheld that copying Disney characters for' 5a
fair use."
comic book was not fair use because "excessive copying precludes
Similarly, where the artist Jeff Koons copied a photograph into sculptural form,
the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Koons held that too much had been copied to qualify
76
for fair use, even under the relatively liberal standard applied to parodies.
This conclusion seems unfair in the context of photographic works. Unlike
the quotation of passages in a book, the sampling of a few notes of music, or the
creation of parodic sculptures or comic books, the photographic process makes
(1994).
71 Further, this reduction in creative output is unlikely to be counterbalanced by an increase in

creative output from the advertisers and artists whose works are likely to be included in public
photographs, since the added incentive of being able to control public photographs of their works
is likely to be minimal. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of this
point.
72 17 U.S.C. § 107.
73 It is interesting to note that some uses that may qualify for de minimis may not qualify for fair
use. As described in Part II.B. 1, infra,even works that are shown in their entirety may qualify for de
minimis, at least in some courts.
74 1NImmER& NIMMER, supra note 7, § 8.01 [G]. See also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150

F.3d 104, 109,47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1295, 1298 (2d Cir. 1998); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates,
581 F.2d 751,756-57, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that "verbatim copying
preclude[s] resort to the fair use defense').
71 Walt Disnty Prods., 581 F.2d at 758.
76 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1500 (2d Cir. 1992).
Despite its conclusion that fair use would not apply even if Koons's sculpture were a parody of the
plaintiff's photograph, the court ruled that the sculpture was not a parody, and accordingly was not
entided to the heightened tolerance of the parody defense. Id
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it impossible to include anything less than an entire copyrighted work in a
photograph if that work fits within the scene the photographer wishes to capture.
Indeed, several courts agree that the nature of the work merits consideration
when weighing the importance of the third factor. Most prominently, in Sony
Corp. ofAmerica v. UniversalCity Studios, the Supreme Court held that, due to the
nature of audiovisual works, "the fact that the entire work is reproduced... does
not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use."77 Similarly,
the First Circuit in NuneZ v. CaribbeanInternationalNews Cop., held that the third
fair use factor was "of little consequence" where a newspaper's publishing of
anything less than an entire copyrighted photograph would have "made the
picture useless. ' 78 Further, news organizations routinely include entire
copyrighted works in their pbotographs and audiovisual works, yet these qualify
for fair use. 79 In sum, although copying an entire work normally militates against
fair use, it is not necessarily dispositive, and may be of limited importance in the
public photograph context due to the nature of photography.
Sony raises another fair use issue of significance for public photography: the
difference between commercial and noncommercial uses. Noncommercial uses,
according to Sony, are presumptively fair uses unless the copyright owner can
demonstrate a likelihood of harm.8" Accordingly, under this standard a number
of public photograph uses-such as posting to a personal website or showing a
film to friends-would qualify as presumptive fair use. However, it is also clear
that some public photograph uses would qualify for the opposite Sony
presumption: that commercial uses are presumptively not fair use.8 For
example, entering a public photograph in a photo contest with cash prizes or

" Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,449-50,220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
665, 681 (1984).
7' Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18,24,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1239,1243 (1st
Cir. 2000). The court in Jackson v. Wamer Bros. Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1603

(E.D. Mich. 1997), went even farther, counting the third factor in favor of the defendant where the
plaintiff's paintings appeared for less than 60 seconds in the defendant's film. See also Ringgold v.
Black Ent't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 80, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1009-10 (2d Cir. 1997)
(noting that it is correct to consider the brevity of the intervals in which a work is shown in
consideration of the third fair use factor, but warning against allowing this to too easily tip the entire
fair use assessment against the defendant).
79 Both the House and Senate Reports on 17 U.S.C. § 107 give the following example of a use
that should qualify as fair use: "incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast,
of a work located in the scene of an event being reported." Sony Cop. of Am., 464 U.S. at 478
(citations omitted).
80

Id. at 451.

" Id. Note, however, that this presumption was weakened in a subsequent case. Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (1994).
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selling prints are likely commercial uses. 8 2 Moreover, technology is blurring an
already murky line83 between commercial and noncommercial uses, and it is not
clear which presumption would apply to some uses. For example, it is not clear
whether posting photographs to an ad-supported website would qualify as a
commercial use.
Further, there is some question regarding how far the Sony standard extends.
The Sony holding-that private VCR recording of television programs for later
viewing is fair use-was limited to private activities, and, accordingly, some
commentators believe that presumptive fair use extends only to uses that are
private in addition to being noncommercial. 84 Although there is little clarity
regarding the meaning of "private,"8 " it is likely that many of the imaging activities
made possible by new technologies-such as posting a photograph to a website,
or screening a film at a film festival-would not qualify.
The theory of market failure, which is described in detail in Part II.C,8 6 may
also have an effect on fair use analyses. In brief, market failure theory holds that
a legal solution such as fair use may be appropriate in cases where the market does
not work properly.8" Thus, a demonstration of failure in the market for use of
copyrighted items in public photographs may lead to a fair use holding. There are
several reasons to believe that failure is likely in the market for consumer use of
public photographs. 88 However, few courts consider market failure in isolation,
and the general trend has been to use market failure theory to restrict fair use, not
expand it. Thus, for example, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., the
Second Circuit ruled that photocopying of scholarly articles by researchers at
Texaco was not fair use despite the fact that nonpayment for such uses was
traditionally permitted. 89 The reason: a licensing market had arisen that made it

82 Courts have a fairly liberal view of what constitutes commercial use. See, e.g., Harper & Row

Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073,1081 (1985) (The
"crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain,
but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying
the customary price"); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,309-10,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492,1499 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that creation of an artwork that was later sold was a commercial use).
83 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, § 13.05[A][1][a].
"4 COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE EMERGING INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCiL, DIGITAL DuIEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INTHE INFORMATIONAGE 129 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITALDILEMMA]; Pamela Samuelson, Toward

a 'New Deal"for Copyrigbtin the Information Age, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1488, 1493 (2002).
85 DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 84, at 130-32.
8 See infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
87 See generaly Wendy J. Gordon, FairUse as Market Failure: A Structuraland Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
8 See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
88 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir.
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relatively easy to obtain a license to photocopy articles. Clearly, the same logic
could work the other way: if market failure becomes more likely, as is likely to be
true of public photography," fair use may be appropriate in areas where it
previously had not been used. However, it is not clear whether courts would
subscribe to this rationale.9
A final factor that may be relevant to a public photography fair use
determination is the fact that the copyrighted items incorporated in public
photographs are, by definition, visible from public places when captured.
Although, in theory, copying a work located in a public place is no more
permissible than copying a work located in a private place, a court interested in
maintaining freedom of speech and action in public places might consider the
location of the copied item in its fair use determination.92 Further, images
incorporating items normally visible in public places might be more likely to be
considered news reporting, criticism, or comment, each of which is a favored
category for fair use purposes.93 The reason: that which occurs in, or is visible
from, a public place is likely to be of public interest. Accordingly, images of these
places, and the copyrightable items in them, are especially likely to be newsworthy,
and criticism or comment on copyrightable items could arguably be inferred in
some instances simply by showing such an item in its public context.94
Nevertheless, the boundaries of each of these categories are difficult to discern.9"

1994). See also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1667 (6th Cir. 1996).
9oSee infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons why market
failure is becoming more likely in the market for public photography.
91 Further, it is important not to take this logic too far. Some scholars worry that an excessive
focus on transaction costs in judicial application of market failure theory may lead to undervaluation
of other factors. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 84, at 130-32 (noting that a government white paper
"interpreted the Sony decision as holding that home taping of programs was fair use because owners
of copyrights in these programs had not yet devised a licensing scheme to charge for these uses");
Wendy J. Gordon, Market FailureandIntellectual Propery: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L.
REv. 1031, 1034 (2002) (expressing the author's view that she "very much regrets" the way in which
her market failure theory has focused on transaction costs only).
92 See Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65, 68,200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 312, 315
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that newscaster's use of a copyrighted song that was playing as it filmed
a street parade was fair use in part because of the public nature of the song's performance).
3 Each of these is listed in the preamble to the fair use statute as a valid purpose of fair use. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
9"Think, for instance, of some of Walker Evans' famous photographs of street advertisements.
95 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 7, § 13.05[A] [1] [a] (noting that the boundaries of the news
exception are "sometimes difficult to determine"); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 561,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073,1081 (1985) ("Courts should be chary ofdecidingwhat
is and what is not news." (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,
215 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill,J., dissenting), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
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Further, it is not clear to what extent courts will be willing to extend these
categories to incorporate consumer activity.
Many more arguments based both on the statutory text and on court decisions
can be made both for and against a finding of fair use for use of public
photographs. However, most of these arguments depend in large part upon the
specific facts of the case at hand, making it difficult to generalize their effect on
public photography. Indeed, there is little that can be concluded with any
certainty regarding the application of fair use to public photography. Under Sony,
private, noncommercial uses are likely to qualify, so historically typical amateur
imaging activities such as those in example #2 (a photograph of a copyrighted
work that is shown only to friends and family) are probably fair use. For each of
96
the other examples, however, there are only arguments and counterarguments;
the final decision could go either way.
Thus we come to the real problem with fair use: uncertainty. 9' There are no
clear rules regarding how each of the four factors should be analyzed, or how the
factors should be weighed against one another. Further, it is not clear how the
uses listed in the preamble98 change the calculus, or what additional factors should
be considered.99 In some ways this uncertainty is not surprising-the fair use test
is designed to be malleable, to allow judges to make their own determinations
regarding when fairness requires an exception to copyright.'0° Nevertheless, it is
problematic, especially for consumers that are likely to be both risk averse and

96 In brief, example #1 may qualify because the copyrighted work is a minor part of the

photograph, but the fact that it is used for commercial purposes cuts against this likelihood.
Example #3 has a chance of qualifying if the website use is noncommercial, but the fact that the
incorporated sculpture is prominently displayed makes this less likely. Example #4 may qualify for
fair use if a court considers the use criticism or comment, but only if the new work specifically
comments on the copyrighted item depicted. The decision in Example #5 may hinge on whether
the contest pays cash prizes.
9' Courts and commentators have long noted the uncertainty fostered by fair use. See, e.g., Time,
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 663, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(calling fair use "so flexible as virtually to defy definition"); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAw & ECONOMICS 132 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that a "vague line, frequently litigated, divides fair
and unfair unauthorized copying"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constituionaho,112 YALE L.J. 1, 16-17 (2002) (Fair use is "routinely refer[red] to as 'resistant to
generalization,' 'unpredictable,' and 'subjective") (citations omitted); Van Houweling, supranote 23,
at 1565.
98 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
" As described earlier, courts can consider factors other than the four statutory factors in their
fair use determinations. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961,1964-65
(1994) (stating that fair use "is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis").
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inexperienced with this area of the law.' 0 ' Moreover, the malleability of fair use
increases the likelihood of inconsistent application, a fact that adds to the
difficulty of predicting ex ante what uses are fair.
Technology increases this uncertainty. New public photograph uses confront
courts with new issues, such as application of fair use doctrine to images on the
Internet. Moreover, technology undermines some of the doctrinal aids that fair
use jurisprudence relies upon. For example, the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial is blurred by technology,0 2 and the definitions of basic terms
like "news gathering," "criticism," and "comment" need to be re-explored to
determine whether they incorporate consumer activity. 3 Also, by enabling
consumers to do more with their images, technology increases fair use uncertainty
in a different way: at the level of those who need to interpret the doctrine.
Consumers who never previously had to make fair use analyses may now be
forced to do so, at least for some public photograph uses. Clearly, they will be
less confident about their conclusions than would be professionals with fair use
experience.
3. A Defensefor Images ofArchitecture: 17 U.S.C f 12 0(a). There is an exception
to the legal morass described in the last few sections. One type of public
photograph can clearly be used for any purpose, commercial or noncommercial,
and by anyone, amateur or professional, without fear of copyright liability. This
exception is codified in § 120(a) of the Copyright Code (§ 120(a)), which states as
follows:
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed
does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or
public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial
representations of the work, if the building in which the work is
4
embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.'0
Section 120(a) resolves the copyright problem for public photographs that
contain no third-party copyrightable works other than architectural works. Under
this exception, persons using these images do not have to obtain licenses, do not
have to worry about the applicability of de minimis or the uncertainty of fair use,
do not need a lawyer to understand their rights, and can take full advantage of
new imaging technologies without worrying that they have crossed an invisible

'0' For a fuller discussion of the benefits of a clear rule, see infra notes 201-05 and accompanying
text.
1o2 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
104

17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2000).
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legal line. Moreover, § 120(a) accomplishes all of this with a simple, easily
understood, bright-line rule.
Because § 120(a) is used as a model for the copyright reform proposed in Part
III, and because it is such an anomaly, it is worth briefly exploring how it was
created. In 1990 Congress passed, and the President signed, the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act 5 (AWCPA), which amended the Copyright Act
of 1976 to give formal copyright protection to architectural works. The main
purpose 1 6 of the AWCPA was fulfillment of U.S. obligations under the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the Berne
Convention), which mandates that
all member countries extend copyright
07
protection to architectural works.
In may seem strange that architectural works were not protected by copyright
prior to 1990 and that it took a treaty to convince Congress to change this. After
all, architectural works are creative works, and many other countries give them
copyright protection. 0 8 Why not the U.S.? There were at least two reasons.
First, architectural works were not totally without protection prior to 1990; it has
long been the settled doctrine that both architectural plans'0 9 and the sculptural
and decorative aspects of architectural works" ° are protected by copyright.
Indeed, two prominent copyright scholars believed that these protections were
sufficient for Berne Convention compliance."' Second, architectural works are
in significant part utilitarian works, and it is axiomatic
that the utilitarian aspects
2
of creative works are not protected by copyright."
The history of copyright protection for architectural works is of particular
interest for current purposes because it led Congressional deliberations over §
120(a) to be unusually free of outside influence." 3 Thus Congress was able to
design copyright protection for architectural works sensibly, without undue
pressure from outside interest groups or historical precedent, and with a full

101Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter AWCPA].
106 H.R. REP. No. 101-735 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6935.
107 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(1),
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Revision, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
10' Indeed, as noted previously, Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention requires that all signatories
extend copyright protection to architectural works.
'o See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.08[D] [2] [a].

11017 U.S.C. § 102(5) (2000).

m H.R. REP. No. 101-735, supra note 106, at 6942.
SeeBakerv. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068,1080,

112

55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769,1777 (9th Cir. 2000); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, spra note 7, 5 2.18.
113 Opposition to § 120(a) was light at the time of its passage. Undoubtedly this was related to
the fact that the AWCPA as a whole, by extending copyright to architectural works for the first time,
was of net benefit for architects despite § 120(a).
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understanding of modern conditions. The fact that Congress chose to exempt
public photographs under these circumstances is telling. Indeed, as will be
explored in Part III, Congress's stated justifications for this decision are both
compelling and applicable outside of the architectural context.
In sum, § 120(a) fully and clearly exempts from copyright public photographs
containing no copyrighted works other than architectural works. However,
because of its limited scope, § 120(a) solves only a small fraction of the public
photography problems described in this Article. Indeed its main value, as will be
demonstrated in Part III, is as a model for a new copyright exemption.
C. MARKET FAILURE AND THE NEED FOR A LEGAL SOLUTION

It may be argued that the story told so far is not necessarily a tragedy. Indeed,
one possible answer to the public photography dilemma is to do nothing at all.
If consumers are now making professional uses of their public photographs,
perhaps the law should simply treat them as it has always treated professionals.
Put another way, whenever de minimis and fair use are unlikely to apply,
consumers could simply obtain a license. Clearly, a license would eliminate the
danger: so long as the licensed user stays within the bounds of the license,
nobody has the right to stop that use on copyright grounds. However, there are
several reasons to believe that reliance on the licensing market would be
misplaced. To understand these reasons, a bit of economic background will be
helpful.
Classical economic theory holds that in conditions of perfect competition,
individuals working to maximize their own well-being will simultaneously
maximize social well-being." 4 The reason: in a perfect market, assets end up in
the hands of those who value them most. For example, the person who values
a car most is the person willing to pay most for it, and, accordingly, is the person
to whom the car will be sold. When all assets are in the hands of those who value
them most, aggregate social value, as measured by the sum of these individual
values, is maximized."' However, this theory assumes perfect markets, an
assumption that seldom reflects reality.' 6 When market imperfections are severe
enough to prevent assets from moving to the parties that value them most, we
have what economists call market failure. 17
114ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

(Edwin Cannon ed., Methuen and Co., Ltd. 5th ed. 1904), bk. IV, ch. II, para. 2.9, availableathttp://
www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN13.htnl (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
115 Id.

116 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 97, at 43 (noting that perfect competition "is unlikely

to be realized in the real world').
117 Id. at 44.
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Market failure in the copyright context was first described in detail by Wendy
Gordon.' 18 In her seminal article on the subject, Professor Gordon argues that
market imperfections-most
notably transaction
costs and
externalities-sometimes prevent efficient uses of copyrighted works." 9 In areas
where these imperfections are likely, legal measures that serve to correct them
may be justified.' 20 As explained in detail below, one such area is the market for
consumer use of public photographs.
Transaction costs-the costs of transferring a right' 2 1-are likely to be quite
high with respect to consumer use of public photographs. First, consider the
costs associated with finding out if the relevant work is copyrighted and locating
the owner if it is."
Both of these tasks will often be quite expensive, as
ownership information may not be readily apparent on the work itself, and there
is no central database that contains all of this information. 123 Second, negotiation
costs will be considerably higher for consumers than they would be for
professionals. Consumers are more likely than professionals to be unskilled and
inexperienced at licensing negotiations and hence may negotiate longer and over
standard terms. Even if a lawyer is hired to counteract this experience effect, the
cost of the lawyer is a transaction cost, as are the costs associated with finding and
building a relationship with that lawyer. Finally, all of these costs may be
multiplied several times over for public photographs that contain more than one
copyrighted work. 24
Compounding the transaction cost problem, consumers often make low-value
uses of public photographs.2 2 They may post images to websites, enter films in

n1 Seegeneralb Gordon, supra note 87.
119 Id
"z Professor Gordon used market failure theory to help explain fair use. However, it should be
noted that market failure is just one possible justification for fair use, not the only one. Gordon, supra
note 91, at 1034-35 ("[M]aximizing economic value 'as measured by willingness to pay' is not the
only norm that matters or should matter for fair use.") (citations omitted).
121 WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 16 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
122 An even more basic cost that might be categorized as a search cost is the cost of education
regarding the need to obtain a license. Many consumers undoubtedly have no idea that a license may
be necessary for certain uses of public photographs. SeeJessica Litman, CopyrightasMyth, 53 U. PITT.
L. REv. 235, 238 (1991) (noting that consumers' ideas about copyright law have "little to do with
actual copyright law").
123 Although there is a database of works that have been registered with the Copyright Office,
registration is not a prerequisite for copyright protection.
124 One might argue that new technologies will also lower some of the transaction costs of
obtaining a license. In particular, communication and information costs are lowered by technologies
such as the Internet and mobile phones. Nevertheless, these effects are unlikely to be strong enough
to overcome the enormous transaction cost barriers faced by an amateur photographer.
125 Low value, in this case, means that the user would not pay much for the ability to make the
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film festivals, or sell prints, but none of these uses is likely to bring a revenue
windfall. There will, of course, be some exceptions to this rule-an amateur
photographer who sells a photograph to an ad agency or an amateur filmmaker
who gets a national distribution deal-but. these exceptions are likely to be
uncommon, even in the age of new technologies. When considered together, the
likelihood of high transaction costs and uses of low monetary value make market
transaction costs exceed anticipated
failure likely. As one author puts it, "[i]f
26
benefits... no transactions will occur.'
Transaction costs are only part of the market failure story. Public
photography use also exhibits another characteristic that can lead to market
failure: externalities. Externalities occur when the parties to a decision do not
internalize all the costs and benefits of that decision, which can lead to incorrect
decisions being made from the standpoint of social utility. Externalities are likely
inpublic photography because photographers do not internalize the significant
social benefits that their activity provides. In particular, as will be discussed in
more detail in Part III, use of public photographs promotes social ideals such as
democracy, autonomy, free speech, and diversity of speech.'27
Thus high transaction costs and the presence of externalities make failure
likely in the consumer market for use of public photographs. This conclusion
makes intuitive sense: it is absurd to expect amateur photographers shooting in
Times Square to obtain a license for each copyrighted item in their images. 28 It
also opens the door for legal solutions that might be unjustified absent market
failure.' 29 Without such a solution, consumers face an unenviable choice: they
must either abandon use of public photographs or risk legal consequences for
those uses. Unfortunately, as described above, current copyright defenses do not
provide an adequate solution. A new legal solution is needed if consumers are to
use public photographs without fear of legal liability.

use. However, the use may nevertheless be of high social value if there are positive externalities
associated with use of public photography. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
126 Gordon, supra note 87, at 1628.
127 See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
128 Why does the licensing market work for professionals? There are several answers. First, in
many instances it may not. Either de minimis or fair use applies to many professional uses of public
photographs, and in these cases there is no need for a market. Second, many of the transaction costs
described above, especially those related to the experience of the user, are higher for consumers than
they would be for professionals. Third, professionals are more likely to make public photograph
uses of high monetary value, and thus are able to overcome the transaction costs necessary to obtain
a license.
129 See general# LANDES & POSNER, supra note 121, at 115-22 (describing various economic
rationales for fair use); Gordon, supra note 87 (describing fair use as a solution to market failure).
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III. A SOLUTION: EXTENDING THE ARCHITECTURAL EXEMPTION To ALL
COPYRIGHTED WORKS

There is a simple solution to the problem described in Part II. It permits both
consumers and professionals to confidently use their public photographs in any
way without fear of copyright liability, and thereby allows society to benefit from
this activity. It is clear, easy to understand, and does little harm to copyright
owners. The solution: extend a modified version of the 17 U.S.C. § 120(a)
architectural exemption to all copyrighted works, so that use of images
incorporating these works does not violate copyright. Section A describes this
proposal in detail. In particular, it fleshes out the proposal with a number of
modifications and clarifications needed to apply S 120(a) to nonarchitectural
works.
Section B presents a three-part justification for the proposal, mirroring the
three justifications that Congress gave for its passage of § 120(a). In addition to
describing and expanding upon Congress's § 120(a) justifications, each Subsection
demonstrates that these justifications apply with equal force to the proposed
expansion of§ 120(a). Subsection 1 describes the benefits of public photography
free of copyright constraints, concluding that these benefits are substantial and
becoming more so as new technologies become available. The low costs of the
proposal are explored in subsection 2. Finally, subsection 3 describes the relative
merits of bright-line rules and balancing tests, concluding that a bright-line rule
is superior for public photography.
A. A DESCRIPTION OF THE SOLUTION

This Article proposes the expansion of § 120(a), in modified form, to cover
all copyrightable works. To help frame the discussion, the sample language below
shows what such an expanded provision might look like:
Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Photographic Representations.
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, the creation, distribution,
duplication, or public display of photographs (including motion
pictures) of or including a copyrighted work shall not be a violation
of copyright if the work depicted is ordinarily visible from a public
place.
In basic effect, this sample provision works like § 120(a). The main difference
is an expansion in scope-the copyright exemption in the suggested provision
applies to all copyrightable works photographed in public places. Additionally,
several changes and clarifications have been made to address issues raised by this
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change in scope, and to correct some imperfections in the original provision.
Each of these changes is discussed below.
First, the proposal applies only to works ordinarily visible from a public place,
whereas 5 120(a) applies to works that are "located in or ordinarily visible from
a public place." 13 The elimination of "located in" is necessary because of the
difference in mobility between architectural works and many other types of
copyrightable works. Because many non-architectural works, such as small
paintings and small sculptures, can be moved, a clever copyist might avoid
copyright by simply moving a copyrighted item to a public place. This problem
is avoided in the revised language.
Of course, this limitation begs the question ofwhat "ordinarily visible" means.
Clearly, it incorporates items such as billboards and public art that are fixed in
place. It should also include items such as jewelry, clothing patterns, and
advertisements that are often found in both public and private places. A more
difficult question centers on copyrighted items that are only sporadically and
temporarily visible in public places, such as artworks being moved from an artist's
studio to a gallery. Although it seems unreasonable to mandate that all such items
in transit be covered to maintain the exclusive right to photographic copies, it is
even more unreasonable to ask the public to discern which items are in transit and
which are not. Accordingly, the word "ordinarily" is intended merely to prevent
photographers from moving copyrightable works to public places themselves; all
other copyrighted works that are visible from a public place are included within
the ambit of the proposal.
Second, unlike 5 120(a) the proposed standard applies only to photographic
images, and not to paintings and other non-photographic pictorial works. The
reason: there are several compelling justifications for treating photographic
images differently from other visual works, justifications that do not extend to
non-photographic pictorial works. First, once a photographer chooses a scene,
it is impossible to change or eliminate certain features; that which fits in the field
of view when the shutter is tripped will be part of the image. Sculptors, painters,
and other visual artists can choose which elements of a scene to incorporate, and
can alter or disguise other elements if desired. For example, a photograph of
Times Square is almost certain to incorporate copyrighted works, while a painting
of the same space could easily alter the copyrightable elements sufficiently to avert
copyright liability."' Second, photographic images are more likely to be made by

17 U.S.C. 5 120(a) (2002).
It is now theoretically possible for photographers ex post to eliminate elements of a scene
with image editing software. However, broadly speaking, the purpose of a photograph is to depict
reality; the removal or obfuscation of copyrighted elements frustrates this purpose. Moreover, many
consumers have neither the skill nor the software necessary to make these adjustments.
130
131
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32
consumers than are other visual works. As will be discussed in detail below,
standards that apply to consumer activity should be simple and easily
understandable. Third, despite § 120(a)'s coverage of all pictorial works,
Congress's main stated area of concern was photographic images. 133 Put another
way, limiting the exception to photographic works is not only more justifiable, but
better tailors the provision to address Congress's stated concerns.
Finally, it is important to address an issue left open by Congress in its passage
of § 120(a): the definition of the term "public place."' 34 After all, "public place"
could mean many different things, including public streets, state-owned buildings,
and perhaps even privately-owned businesses open to the public. Although there
is no ideal answer to this question, the best approach is to try to match public
expectations, thereby minimizing the gap between the law and the public's
perception of it. 135 Based on their past experiences, most people probably expect
a great deal of freedom to use images captured on public streets. This is less likely
to be true of images captured on private property, even if that property is open
to the public. Similarly, few people would expect complete freedom to use images
taken in places that are not open to the general public, whether those places are
state-owned or privately owned. Working from these insights, "public place" can
be defined as any place that is both owned by the state and open to the general
public.
Some may worry that this definition would include museums and other
institutions where it might be preferable to maintain a higher level of copyright
protection. However, nothing in this proposal would prevent these institutions
from limiting photography, as is often done currently (although any such
limitations may be subject to First Amendment review).1 36 Another possible
problem may arise from consumer confusion between privately-owned property
and publicly-owned property, as might occur, for example, on Main Street at
Disneyland. This issue might be resolved using a "reasonable consumer" model:

132 See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
13' H.RI REP.No. 101-735, supra note 106, at 6953 (evincing a Congressional desire to protect
tourist and scholarly "photographs").
" For clarity, it should be noted that images need not be captured from public places to qualify
for § 120(a). For example, a tourist who moves into a private parking lot to shoot Times Square
does not suddenly lose the protection of§ 120(a). Rather, so long as each architectural work in his
image is visible from a public place, § 120(a) applies regardless of where the image was taken. This
should also be true of the expanded rule proposed herein.
135 See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 199-207 (noting the importance of creating laws that do not make
the average citizen a habitual lawbreaker).
"36See generaly Note, Privaty, Photography,and the Press, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1086 (1998).
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if a reasonable consumer would consider Disneyland's thoroughfares to be public
streets, then they qualify as public places.' 37
The sample provision provided above and the discussion of its details are
merely starting points. More exhaustive analysis is necessary before any such
provision can be finalized, and reasonable people can disagree about some of the
details. 3 However, the basic idea-that use of public photographs should be
free of copyright constraints-is a clear improvement over the status quo, and
justifiable as such. It is to this justification that this Article turns in the next
section.
B. A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SOLUTION

Congress gave three reasons for § 120(a): the benefits are large, the costs are
negligible, and a simple rule is preferable. 39 In addition to describing and
expanding upon each of these rationales, this section demonstrates that each
provides support for the proposed expansion of § 120(a).
1. Benefits. Congress's first justification for § 120(a) centers on the value
created by ensuring that copyright does not limit use of pictorial representations
of architecture. This value, in Congress's view, was much more than mere
avoidance of the evils commonly associated with copyright."4 Rather, Congress
was focused on the plight of tourists taking pictures of landmarks,' scholars
using photographs for their studies, 4 2 and the "important public purpose"'4 3

137

Disney could easily avoid this result by clearly informing its customers upon entry that

Disneyland is private property.
13 In particular, there may be good reasons to add a clause to prevent blatant copying of
copyrighted works (especially photographic works) on public streets, such as a requirement that the
new § 120(a) apply only to works that are minimally transformative or that do not significantly harm
the primary market for the original work. However, the costs of such an addition, particularly the
uncertainty it would add, may outweigh the benefits.
139 H.RI REP. No. 101 -735, supra note 106, at 6953.
40 Basic axioms of copyright theory hold that copyright harms the public interest by allowing
the holder to extract monopoly rents and by limiting dispersion of the copyrighted works to
inefficiently low levels. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law &_'Economics of Intelkctual Property,
DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 6, 9-10; William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, andAppropriation
Art. An EconomicApproach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2000).
141 H.R. REP. No. 101-735, supra note 106, at 6953 (noting that "[m]illions of people visit
our
cities every year and take back home photographs, posters, and other pictorial representations of
prominent works of architecture as a memory of their trip").
142 Id (noting that "numerous scholarly books on architecture are based on the ability to use
photographs of architectural works").
143 Id See also ArchitecturalDesign Prot.: Hearingon H.R. 3990 and H.R 3991
Before the Subcomm. on
Courts,Intel Prop., and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Juday, 101 st Cong. 70-71 (1990)
[hereinafter AWCPA Hearings] (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights and Associate
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served by their freedom of action. Expanding upon Congress's reasoning, this
subsection argues that numerous benefits flow from freedom to create and use
public photography, and that these benefits apply with equal force outside the
architectural context.
It has long been known that the image is an extremely effective
communications tool.'" Indeed, belief in the power of images is so commonly
held that it has become an adage: a picture is worth a thousand words. In some
instances even the adage may be an understatement" 4 -- think of the Rodney King
video, or an Ansel Adams landscape. As one author puts it, "photography is the
most pervasive and influential means of depiction in modem culture."'" This
does not mean, of course, that images are always the most effective means of
communication, but it is clear that certain types of ideas and emotions are
through images than through any other means of
conveyed more 1effectively
47
communication.
Notwithstanding this power, large-scale communication with images, except
in its most basic form, has always been a one-way street-from large media
companies and advertisers to consumers. The reason: it was too expensive for
consumers. New technologies change this. As described above,' large-scale
communication with images is, or soon will be, within the means of most of the
public. Accordingly, new technologies are bringing an extremely effective form
of communication to the masses,14' a change that can dramatically improve social

Librarian of Congress for Copyright Services) (noting that pictorial representations of architectural
works "serve a valuable public interest').
" See Brent D. Ruben, Animal Communicaion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION AND
INFORMATION 26 (Jorge Reina Schement, ed., 2002) ("Messages take a variety of forms-visual,
tactile, olfactory, gustatory, and auditory. Visual messages are particularly important to humans.");
Calvin Massey, Civic DiscourseAmid CulturalTranfformation, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE
193,199 (2000); TimothyJ. Moran, FormatRestrictionson TelenisedPoliticalAdvertising:ElevatingPoltical
Debate Without SuppressingFree Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663, 668-70 (1992); Note, supra note 136, at 1095.
145 "A picture may be worth a thousand words, but a thousand words rarely communicate as
Chris Woodford, Information Design, in
quickly and effectively as a well-chosen picture."
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW MEDIA 234 (Steve Jones, ed., 2003).
146Joel Snyder, Photography, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATIONs 274
(Erik Barnouw, ed. 1989).
147 Evidence of the effectiveness of images in communications surrounds us. For example,
advertisements in newspapers, magazines, and on our streets often rely primarily on images to
communicate their messages.
145 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
'4 This contrasts with written and verbal communications, for which there was always an outlet.
Even the poorest (literate) individual could always write an essay or a letter to the editor, pass out
handbills, pick up the telephone, or speak in a public park. The options for image communications
were less attractive: getting quality photographs was an expensive endeavor, and distribution was
largely limited to showing prints to friends and entering photo contests.
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welfare by promoting communicative efficiency. To understand the potential
significance of this change, consider the effect of bringing literacy, or the
telephone, from the elites to all corners of society.' As with those changes, the
ability to use images in communication when such use is more efficient than other
forms of communication can have a large social and economic impact.'
Photographic images can also give voice to segments of the population unable
to speak effectively using other means of communication. Non-native English
speakers, the illiterate, and the poor may find communication with images easier
than verbal or written communication. After all, effective written and oral
communication generally requires a common language and a minimum level of
education, whereas anybody who knows how to work a camera-a process that
is often as simple as pressing a button---can create images.
This last point is important for several reasons. First, it provides further
support for the argument made above: that inexpensive imaging can create large
communicative efficiencies, thereby increasing social welfare. Indeed, the
efficiencies are largest for those who do not have any other effective means of
large-scale communication. Second, it suggests that imaging can increase the
diversity of social discourse, an effect that can create further economic benefits
as new ideas become available.' Finally, apart from its economic benefits, giving
a voice to those who previously had none promotes a number of important social
ideals, including individual autonomy and robust democratic discourse.' 53
The communicative value of images is likely to be especially important in
photographs of public places. Photographers wishing to communicate with broad
audiences often do so by depicting the world around them, thereby appealing to
a common reservoir of visual experience they share with the viewer. As Ansel
Adams once wrote, "Photography is a way of telling what you feel about what you

150 It may be a bit of an exaggeration to liken photography's technological changes to literacy and
the telephone, but only because most members of society today already have a variety of
communication tools at their disposal. Nevertheless, communication using images is different
enough from these other possibilities that there is reason to believe it will have a significant impact.
151 More generally, several scholars have noted the potential importance of the amateur
production made possible by new technologies, particularly the Internet. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler,
Freedom in the Commons: Towards a PolicalEconomyofInformation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1246-47 (2003)
(noting that decentralized, nonmarket production can now play a much more important role in the
economy); Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 28, at 8 (noting that amateur content production is
providing benefits "previously provided exclusively by the mechanisms of copyright law").
152 Yochai Benkler has suggested that bringing more diversity into society's productive system
may yield substantial benefits. Benkler, supra note 151, at 1254 ("The promise of the networked
information economy and the digitally networked environment is to bring this rich diversity of living
smack into the middle of our economy....").
153 Each of these ideals is discussed in greater detail infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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see."'5" Public places are paradigmatic examples of this shared visual experience,
and copyrightable works viewable from these places become a part of those
places. Images of public places, and of the copyrightable works visible from
them, are likely to be socially valuable precisely because they appeal to, and
comment on, this common experience.
Relatedly, it is clear that much of the value of copyrightable works located in
public places comes from the places and not the works. This is why advertisers
are willing to pay for public placement,'55 and why artists are willing to work for
56
a lower fee (or even without pay) if their art will be located in a public place.'
Thus, to the extent that copyright interferes with the public's freedom of action
with respect to such places, it may transfer some of the value of such places from
the public to copyright owners. In more concrete terms, a copyright holder with
the ability to prevent others from using public photographs incorporating his
work also controls the use of some images of the public place itself. This justifies
treatment separate from that given to copyrighted works not visible from public
places.
Finally, and more generally, a number of scholars have made compelling
arguments regarding non-economic benefits that may be harmed when copyright
constrains consumer activity. Joseph Liu describes the need for copyright to
consider consumer interests in autonomy, communications, and creative selfexpression."' Yochai Benkler writes about copyright's potential effects on
democracy, autonomy, and social justice.'5 8 Jed Rubenfeld believes that copyright
unjustifiably impinges on freedom of expression.'59 And Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling worries about the effect of copyright on the expressive opportunities
of the poor. 6" To some degree all of these authors share the insight that the

'54
155

John Kemp, Photos Use Scenes You've Seen, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 7, 1993, at 4H1.
In one stark piece of evidence of the value of placing an ad in a public place, a building owner

in Times Square sued Warner Brothers, the distributor of Spider-Man, because the studio digitally
altered an ad that would otherwise have appeared in a shot of Times Square. The case was
dismissed. Sherwood 48 Assocs. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 02-9100, 2003 WL 22229422 (2d Cir.

2003).
15' One piece of support for artists' willingness to work for free in exchange for public exposure
comes from the large public art projects implemented in recent years by several cities, including
Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. In each of these projects, artists were invited to decorate
blank, uniform sculptures that were then installed in various spots throughout each city. The artists
donated their services, and proceeds from the projects went to charity.

157 Liu, supra note 23, at 406-20.
15'

Benlder, supra note 151, at 1262-72. More specifically, Benlder discusses the positive effects

of nonproprietary, commons-based production on democracy, autonomy and justice. He views
copyright as one potential impediment to achieving these effects. Id. at 1263, 1272-73.
159 Rubenfeld, supra note 97, at 4.
160 See generalyVan Houweling, supra note 23.
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currently dominant copyright debate, which focuses primarily on incentives and
wealth maximization, is both myopic and outdated. Other factors need to be
considered as new technologies increase expressive opportunities. Moreover,
many of these factors take on added significance in the public photograph
context. Autonomy, democracy, social justice, and free speech are all concepts
that are especially threatened by restrictions on activity in public places.
Communications and creative self-expression, as described above, 161 are
particularly threatened by restrictions on photography.
In sum, Congress was right: there is a valuable public interest to be served by
ensuring that images incorporating architectural works are free of copyright
constraints. Yet these same advantages apply equally to images incorporating
other copyrightable works visible from public places. Of course, society can
capture some of the benefits described above without modifying copyright, since
some public photograph uses would qualify as de minimis or fair use. Yet there
are many public photograph uses that are not clearly covered by either of these
doctrines. 162 Further, as Congress intuited with respect to architectural works, the
uncertainty associated with each of these doctrines, particularly fair use, is likely
to have a significant chilling effect even on some public photography uses that are
163
permissible.
2. Costs. Congress's second reason for passage of § 120(a) was its view that
the costs of the provision would be minimal. More specifically, Congress
determined that copyright protection for pictorial representations of architectural
works is not necessary to incentivize architects to create those works. 164 This
subsection explains why reduced incentives must be the focus of any discussion
of the costs of copyright reduction, and applies this metric to public photographs
of non-architectural works. It concludes that the costs of the proposed expansion
of§ 120(a) are likely to be small.
In the United States, copyright law is usually justified by the need to give
authors adequate incentives to create copyrightable works. 65 This justification
161 See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
162 See supra Parts II.B. 1 and II.B.2.
163

For discussion of Congress's insight regarding fair use uncertainty, see infra notes 183-85 and

accompanying text.
164 See H.R. REP. No. 101-735, supra note 106, at 6953 (ustifying the exemption by noting that
pictorial uses "do not interfere with the normal exploitation of architectural works," and by noting
"the lack of harm to the copyright owner's market"); AWCPA Hearings, supra note 143, at 70-71
(statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian of Congress for
Copyright Services) (noting that "the economic incentive to be protected is that relating to the built
three-dimensional structure ...[and] two-dimensional reproductions of architectural works ...are
not a necessary component of that economic incentive").
165 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1073, 1080 (1985) ("By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright
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derives from the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes the creation of intellectual
property rights to "Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."' 6 6 Without
copyright, the theory goes, creative works suffer from an appropriability problem:
they can be copied and sold by third parties at their marginal cost. Thus creators
are prevented from recouping their up-front creative costs and are dissuaded from
creating more works, and the public loses the benefits these new works might
bring. 67 Copyright, which is primarily designed to benefit the public, 68 solves
this problem by granting creators temporary monopoly rights that allow them to
recover their fixed creative costs, thus assuring a continued supply of new creative
to create that
works. Put another way, it is by increasing artists' incentives
169
copyright is able to achieve its Constitutional purpose.
If copyright's purpose is achieved by increasing incentives, then the cost of
failing to extend copyright to a given area (or of removing a copyright grant) can
be measured primarily by the resulting reduction in creative incentives, or, more
precisely, by the effect this reduction has on the continued supply of creative
works. Thus, Congress was correct to focus on the likely effect of § 120(a) on
architects' incentives when considering the costs of that section. Congress's
conclusion-that freedom to make and use pictorial representations of
architectural works without fear of copyright liability would not have any
significant effect on architects' creative incentives' 7° -makes intuitive sense. It
is unlikely that many architects create their works primarily, or even in part,
because of anticipated revenue from pictorial representations of the work.
Generally speaking, there is no such revenue.
This same conclusion holds true for the vast majority of non-architectural,
copyrighted works visible from public places. To see why, consider the nature of

supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.'); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 681 (1984) ("The purpose of
copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.'); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65, 67 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
1NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.'). See aLso
7, § 1.03[A]; Landes, supra note 140, at 5.
CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 8.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 97, at 120-21; Landes, supra note 140, at 5.
Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 429.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Congress is given great deference by the courts regarding

166 U.S.
167
168
169

how best to achieve copyright's Constitutional purpose. In one recent case the Supreme Court
found that Congress could rationally determine that factors other than creative incentives-such as
adhesion to an international copyright treaty-may promote the useful arts and sciences regardless
of their effects on creative incentives. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1235-36 (2003).
171See

supra note 164.
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such works:
advertisements, public artworks, jewelry, clothing patterns,
newspapers, and magazines. There is almost never a market for photographic
representations of these works alone. Rather, to the extent that photographic
images including these works are valuable, it is generally due to the value of a
representation of the place in which the work is depicted (think of a home video
of Times Square) or to the creative spark that the photographer brings to the
reproduction (think of Walker Evans' photographs of street signs). Clearly,
creators of works for which there is no photographic representation market are
not incentivized by the possibility of revenue from photographic representations.
Accordingly, removal of the exclusive right to use such photographic
representations will have no incentive effect with respect to these creators.
There may be rare exceptions, cases in which, for example, photographs of a
mural have significant value apart from the place in which it is depicted and the
way in which it is photographed. Yet separating these values is impossible, and
giving the muralist control over all of them is heavy-handed, especially
considering the small percentage of works for which this is an issue. Further,
even in these exceptional cases it is unlikely that the potential revenue from
photographic representations represents a significant part of the creator's
incentives. Rather, such creators are often fully compensated in other ways: the
prestige of having their work in the public eye, the advertisement value of having
many people view their work, or perhaps even payment from a patron."'
Creative works are not going to disappear from public places if the exclusive right
to use photographic representations is revoked.
Further, even if there is an incentive effect, a reduction in incentives is not
necessarily a bad thing. As discussed above,"7 2 classic appropriation theory
predicts that without any intellectual property protection there will be an
inefficiently small amount of creative work,'73 but it does not suggest that more
protection is always better. Rather, there is a point at which the marginal value
of additional intellectual property incentives is outweighed by the marginal cost
of giving those incentives. If society has passed this point-if creators are given
more copyright protection than is necessary to incentivize them to create the
optimal amount of creative work-a reduction in copyright is efficient.
Numerous scholars have convincingly argued that the U.S. copyright system is at
just such a point."7 4 Of course, this general conclusion does not prove that any
171See LANDES& POSNER, supra note 121, at 48, 53 (discussing how authors derive benefits other
than royalties from publication).
172See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
113

See COOTER & ULEN, supranote 97, at 120-21.

174 Seegeneraly LESSIG, supra note 10; LANDES& POSNER, supra note 121, at 214;James Boyle, The

Public Domain: The Second Enclosure Movement and The Construction of The Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38-44 (2003).
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reduction in copyright would be efficient: complete elimination of copyright
protection for paintings, for example, would clearly do more harm than good.
Nevertheless, it does suggest that reducing a certain type of copyright benefit
while leaving other copyright benefits in place-the proposed expansion of §
120(a) is a good example-may bring creative incentives closer to the ideal level,
not farther away.
Moreover, technology may have reduced the need for financial incentives to
spur creativity.'
Amateur creative production is becoming a more important
part of societal creative production,'76 and is often undertaken without
expectation of financial reward. Indeed, even complex tasks requiring numerous
inputs can now be accomplished without financial incentives. 7 Although this
effect is most important for works like open-source software, it may have some
effect on works visible from public places. 8 For example, the Internet allows
amateur muralists to organize themselves to create a mural more easily than was
previously possible. Similarly, inexpensive design and production equipment
makes it easier for consumers to produce posters, newsletters, and other items
that may be viewed in public places.
Some may argue that regardless ofconstitutional permissiveness79 a discussion
of incentives does not capture the entire cost of the proposed expansion of 5
120(a). Those in the natural rights school of copyright may argue that there is
another cost that should be considered: the cost to the dignity and autonomy of
creators who lose control of some aspects of their works. This argument,
however, is especially weak in the context of works visible from a public place.
As discussed above, ° giving the creator control over photographic
representations of his work would give him some degree of control over the
public places from which the work is viewed. If you put up a sculpture in the
middle of Times Square and have the right to control images of that work, then
you have effective control over some activities of the public in relation to Times
Square. Put more generally, the right of the artist to control his work conflicts
with the public's freedom of activity with respect to public places. Moreover,

"' See LITMAN, supra note 43, at 102-03 (noting that much proprietary content is being published
on the web despite the lack of a clear financial incentive); Boyle, supra note 174, at 44-49. Seegeneral
Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
176 See spra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
177 See general#y Benkler, spra note 175.
17' Boyle, supra note 174, at 47-48.
179 As aforementioned, there is some constitutional leeway to consider factors other than
incentives, so long as those factors rationally relate to promotion of the useful arts and sciences. See
supranote 169. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this leeway is so broad as to permit a pure natural
rights argument.
"8 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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given the benefits gained by creators from placing their works in public
places-publicity and a chance to shape opinions, among others-one might
consider placement of a creative work in a public place an implied license to use
that work in ways that might not otherwise be permitted.
In sum, as with 5 120(a) itself, the costs of the proposed expansion of§ 120(a)
are likely to be low. Creative incentives, the main determinant of costs, are
unlikely to be affected in any significant way. Further, even if there are
exceptional cases where the proposal does reduce creative incentives, it may
simply bring them closer to the ideal level, not farther away.
3. The Superiority of a Simple, Bnight-A'ne Rule for PublicPhotography. It may be
argued that there is a paradox in congressional reasoning in support of 5 120(a).
The two uses of architectural images about which Congress specifically expresses
concern 18-tourists snapping photographs of architectural landmarks 182 and the
use of architectural images in scholarly works-are among the uses most likely to
qualify for fair use. 18 Why is an exception for pictorial uses necessary if the
particular uses Congress is most concerned about are already privileged? The
answer is Congress's third stated.reason for 5 120(a): avoidance of "ad hoc" fair
use decisions. 4 As discussed above, there is a great deal of uncertainty inherent
in the fair use test.'85 By creating a simple, bright-line rule, Congress eliminated
the possibility that courts might find some uses of architectural images
unprivileged, and gave photographers confidence that their uses of such images
were privileged.
Creation of a bright-line rule, however, has its drawbacks. Most prominently,
bright-line rules can be overinclusive and underinclusive, thereby creating unfair
results in some cases.' 86 Indeed, it is exactly this problem-placement of the 5
120(a) bright line-that has most concerned scholars critical of § 120(a). These
concerns have taken three forms. First, scholars puzzle over Congress's singling
out of pictorial representations for special treatment, while sculptural

'8

See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.

182 It can be inferred from the date of the AWCPA-1990-that Congress did not have in mind

tourists who make nontraditional, technologically-enabled uses of their images.
183SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Copyrightin the 101st Congress: Commentay on the VisualAristsRisghts Act

and theArchitecturalWorks Copyrigbt ProtectionAct of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLAJ.L.& ARTs 477,495 n.73
(noting that tourist snapshots and an architecture student's drawings would likely qualify as fair use).
With respect to scholarly works, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (noting that scholarship is a privileged

class of use).
184

H.R. REP. No. 101-735, supra note 106, at 6953.
discussion of the uncertainty inherent in most fair use determinations, see supra

185For a fuller

notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
186Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An EconomicAnaqysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 591 (1992)
(noting that simple rules are sometimes over- and underinclusive).
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representations of architectural works are judged under the fair use doctrine. 187
To paraphrase one author, why should copyright extend to pencil sharpeners in
the shape of the Chrysler Building, but not to posters and t-shirts depicting the
same building?' 88 Second, scholars complain about the lack of an obvious
justification for limiting the § 120(a) exception to architecture.' 89 As one author
notes, there is no compelling reason to treat visual representations of a
monumental outdoor sculpture differently from those of the Guggenheim
museum.' 90 Finally, and relatedly, there is some concern regarding what qualifies
as architecture for purposes of § 120(a).'91 For example, one author puzzles over
whether the Washington Monument would qualify as an architectural work.' 92
A related problem was presented in one of the few cases to interpret the limits
of § 120(a). In Leicester v. Warner Brothers, the creator of a sculptural work sued
Warner Brothers for showing his work without permission in scenes of the film
Batman Forever.'93 He claimed that his work, which was attached to a building, was
separately copyrightable as a sculptural work, and therefore not subject to 5
120(a).194 The court disagreed, ruling that the work was subject to § 120(a), and
noting "it would be counterintuitive to suppose that Congress meant to restrict
pictorial copying to some, but not all, of a unitary architectural work."' '
Leicester is important because it further demonstrates the difficulty of
separating architectural works from other types of works for purposes of § 120(a).
A rule that all copyrightable works attached to buildings are subject to § 120(a)
enormously expands the scope of that provision, and there is no dear theoretical
basis for treating, for example, a free-standing sculpture differently from a
sculpture attached to a building. On the other hand, a rule that all copyrightable
works attached to buildings are not subject to § 12 0(a) eviscerates the provision,
and makes it easy to avoid simply by placing separately copyrightable works on
architectural works.
There are answers to these line-drawing concerns. As a preliminary matter,
even if a bright-line rule creates some unfair results at the margin, this is not the

187

See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 183, at 495; Clark T. Thiel, The Architectural Works Copyright

Protection Gesture of 1990, or, 'Hg,That Looks L"ke My Building!," 7 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.

1,23-24; Raphael Winick, Note, CopyrightProtectionforArhitectureAfterthe A rchitecturalWorks Copyright
ProtectionAct of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1626 (1992).
Ginsburg, supra note 183, at 495.
189See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 183, at 494-95; Winick, supra note 187, at 1626-27.
190AWCPA Hearings, supra note 143, at 187 (letter from Jane C. Ginsburg).
191See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 183, at 494-95; Winick, supra note 187, at 1626-27.
192 Thiel, supranote 187, at 24-25.
193 Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (9th Cir. 2000).
194Id. at 1219.
191 Id. at 1220.
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end of the analysis. Rather, in cases where, as here, the choice is between a
bright-line rule that draws arguably arbitrary distinctions at the margin and a
balancing standard that adds uncertainty to the legal analysis, the question to ask
is which rule, on balance, is most likely to maximize social welfare.' 96 In the case
of architectural photography, Congress clearly viewed the uncertainty of fair use
as a significant problem,' 97 while the harm caused by the line-drawing problems
described above is less clear. Thus, it was reasonable to favor § 120(a), with its
bright-line test, over the uncertainty of fair use.
Second, the proposed expansion described in this Article would resolve many
of the most problematic aspects of § 120(a). The expansion would clearly apply
to any copyrightable item visible from a public place. Thus, it would no longer
be necessary to distinguish architectural works from sculptural works, or to decide
if copyrighted works attached to buildings fit within the scope of the provision.
Moreover, although the expanded section would apply only to photographic
copies, the line drawn in the proposal between photographic and other creative
works is far more defensible than § 120(a)'s current distinction between pictorial
works and sculptural works. 98
Nevertheless, the expansion of § 120(a) does not eliminate all possibility of
over- and underinclusiveness. In particular, as described above, the definition of
"public place" may not always match consumer expectations. 99 Further, there is
some possibility for abuse by those intent on profiting from the creativity of
others. 200 However, against these potential problems must be weighed the
advantages of a bright-line rule. Two such advantages are of particular
importance. First, bright-line rules are clear-whether or not you agree with the
result, simple rules make it easy (relative to balancing tests) to know how the law
applies to a particular activity. Second, bright-line rules leave little room for
judicial interpretation, thus promoting confidence and consistency.
These two advantages-clarity and consistency-are sorely needed at the
intersection of copyright and public photography. The first Parts of this Article
described how consumers taking advantage of new technologies are both more

196Obviously, once a basic rule structure is chosen, the rule can and should be fine-tuned to
minimize its weaknesses. These measures may include, for example, adding some elements of
balancing to a bright-line test, or creating some clear safe harbors in a balancing test.
197 H.R. REP. No. 101-735, supra note 106, at 6953.
'9' For a flil discussion of why the distinction between photographic works and other types of
visual works is defensible, see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
-o
One might, for example, imagine a photograph of an advertisement for a photography
exhibition, cropped to show only the photograph depicted in the ad, and sold as a print. However,
the danger of this possibility should not be exaggerated, as the quality of the copy is likely to be quite
low.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2005

39

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2
J. INTELL PROP.L[

[Vol. 13:61

likely to infringe third party copyrights and more likely to be sued if they do so.
Thus, copyright law for the first time is likely to directly affect the actions and
fortunes of consumers using public photographs. Yet current copyright law is not
comprehensible to the average consumer.2"' As Jessica Litman writes, copyright
is a "complex, internally inconsistent, wordy and arcane code, since the only folks
who really needed to know it were folks for whom copyright lawyers were an item
of essential overhead."2 2 Rules that may have made sense when only
professionals needed to understand copyright need to be simplified when applied
to consumers.
The proposed expansion of § 120(a) accomplishes this in the public
photography context. It dearly identifies a set of public photograph uses that are
privileged, thereby allowing consumers to avoid fair use and de minimis, doctrines
that even the most knowledgeable copyright lawyers often find
incomprehensible. °3 Indeed, there is value to this clarity even in circumstances
where de minimis or fair use would apply. It is much easier for a consumer to
read and rely upon clear wording in a statute than to be confident about a casebased fair use determination.2°
The clarity of a bright-line rule helps consumers in another way. A complex,
ambiguous legal standard like fair use favors those with the power and resources
to litigate. Consumers unsure of their legal rights will rarely be willing to risk
litigation, even in cases where a fair use determination seems likely. Rather, a
cease-and-desist letter from the copyright owner will often be enough to convince
consumers to stop making the use in question. This is less likely to be true of a
statutory rule like § 120(a) that makes the legality of the use absolutely clear. Such
a rule would make the user more confident of his rights, and more likely to
defend them.
Finally, the simple rule proposed in this Article makes intuitive sense: it
conforms to people's instincts about what copyright should and should not
protect. The average person believes that he should be able to do what he likes
with photographs taken in public places, just as he has always done. Tell him that
he cannot, or that he must undertake an elaborate balancing test to find out, and
he is likely to respond that the rule makes no sense. 215 And he would be right.

72.

201

LITMAN, supranote 43, at

202

Id.at 19.

203

See smpra note 97.
This was Congress's insight when it expressed concern about the "ad hoc" nature of fair use

24

determinations. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, supra note 106, at 6953.
2' See LITMAN, supra note 43, at 115 (discussing the likely reaction of a typical consumer faced
with a copyright rule that does not conform to his expectations).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Technological changes are empowering consumers to use photographs in ways
once reserved to professionals. However, these same technologies make it more
likely that consumers will come into conflict with copyright owners whose works
are incorporated in their images. This conflict is especially likely with respect to
photographs of public places, many of which inevitably include third-party
copyrighted works.
Copyright law is ill-equipped to handle these changed circumstances. In
particular, the de minimis and fair use tests, which in the past have served as
bulwarks against unreasonable application of copyright, are not well-suited to this
task today. In most courts de minimis does not apply to the vast majority of
Fair use's greatest weakness-uncertainty-is
public photography uses.
becoming a more significant liability in an age where image uses are no longer
easily classified and image users are less likely to be legally sophisticated.
photographs of architectural works as a model, Congress should exempt from
copyright all uses of photographic representations of copyrighted items ordinarily
visible in public places. The benefits of such a change would be great, and the
costs minimal. Moreover, this change would create a simple, easily-understood
rule that is well-suited to the needs of consumers.
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